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Abstract. Trumponomics describes the economic policies of U.S. President Donald 
Trump and has “America-first” approach. The Trump administration risks creating a 
more fragmented global economy and has started the biggest global trade war. The 
various sides are still on tenterhooks to impose additional tariffs worth hundreds of 
billions of dollars. Using deadweight loss (also known as excess burden or allocative 
inefficiency) and Harberger's triangle, this study shows that: the trade war is devastating 
not just for the US and China, but for the whole world economy: (i) the prices of items 
that directly affect consumers’ welfare will rise; (ii) firms will face extra costs for exports; 
(iii) investors will become more nervous; (iv) some investors will diversify into Bitcoin 
and other cryptocurrencies; (v) the trade war could turn into a currency war; (vi) even 
developed countries could be hit by the trade war; and (vii) tariffs applied on developing 
countries’ exports would rise steeply. In a trade war, everyone may lose. 
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Introduction 
A trade war is an economic conflict that result from extreme protectionism 
where countries raise or create tariffs (or other trade barriers) against each other 
in retaliation to trade barriers created by the other party.1 A consequence of a 
misapprehension of the benefits of free trade, trade wars can be instigated if one 
country sees another country's trading practices to be unfair (Krugman, 2016; 
                                                                        
1 A tariff is a tax imposed on imported goods and services. 
Zoellick, 2017). It can therefore result from a protectionist stance. Protectionism 
restricts international trade, though most often the general intent is to protect 
local businesses and jobs from foreign competition (Coughlin et al., 2000).  
In 2017 and 2018, President Donald Trump embarked on a protectionist 
campaign, in an attempt to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States 
from other nations such as China where such jobs have been outsourced 
(Costinot, 2009; Zoellick, 2017). He imposed a new import duty on 818 goods 
from China totaling $34 billion. China retaliated in kind, imposing a 25% duty 
on the import of U.S. goods, also totaling $34 billion.  
The advantages and disadvantages of such protectionism are the subject of 
fierce debate that has a long history in political economy and world politics 
(Findlay, 2017; George, 2017; Irwin, 2017; Alden 2018). Standard economic 
theory highlights the adverse effects of trade protectionism (Draper, 2017; Fong, 
2017; Zissimos, 2017; Weingast, 2018). Critics argue that protectionism can 
lead to price increases of domestic manufactured goods as well as slow down 
economic growth and cultural exchange. However, proponents argue that the 
free trade principle that trade is mutually beneficial for countries has always 
been mired with national political calculus in negotiations. They argue that 
protectionism in conjunction with well-crafted policies can provide competitive 
advantages and generate more jobs (Costinot, 2009; Abboushi, 2010).  
However, it is diﬃcult to uncover from this debate any widely accepted 
ramifications and effects of the US-China trade war. Thus it is not clear what 
the effects and implications of the US-China trade war are likely to be. This 
study fills the gap. It identifies the effects of US-China trade war on consumers, 
firms, stocks, cryptocurrency, developed and developing countries. The layout 
of this article is as follows. The next section discusses Trumponomics and the 
US-China trade war. Section 2 describes the theory of the deadweight loss and 
Harberger's Triangle in relation to the US-China trade war. Section 3 presents 
the implications of the US-China trade war.  The last section concludes. 
 
1. Trumponomics and the US-China Trade War 
Trumponomics describes the economic policies of U.S. President Donald 
Trump to restructure trade deals, cut personal and corporate taxes, and introduce 
large fiscal stimulus measures focused on infrastructure and defense. For further 
details into the appurtenances and technicalities of Trumponomics, see Ruccio 
(2017), Ghosh (2017), Jakupec (2017), Locke (2017) and Jakupec (2018). 
Trumponomics has “America-first” approach. By this, it risks creating a 
more polarized global economy. In fact, it has started the biggest global trade 
war by imposing a new import duty on 818 goods from China totaling $34 
billion. China has retaliated in kind, imposing a 25% duty on the import of U.S. 
goods, also totaling $34 billion. The Trump administration has also extended 
the trade war to Canada (which has imposed tariffs on $12.8 billion worth of US 
goods in return), the EU (which has enforced tariffs on $7.2 billion of US 
products in return), and Russia (which has also slammed 25-40% additional 
duties on the import of American products). In 2018, President Donald Trump 
has threatened significant tariffs on Chinese goods, as much as $500 billion on 
products including steel and soy. He has also threatened to pull the U.S. out of 
the World Trade Orgaization (WTO)2. The Trump administration and the 
affected countries are still on tenterhooks to impose additional tariffs worth 
hundreds of billions of dollars.  
With the imposition of tariffs, the Trump administration hopes to reduce 
the large US trade deficit with China as well as to impel China to make key 
adjustments to its economic policies, including reducing existing tariffs and 
limiting the alleged theft of US intellectual property by Chinese firms. The 
Trump administration seeks to use trade negotiations to massage its electorate’s 
concerns over the lost manufacturing industries of the US rust belt and the 
perception that China’s trade practices are “not fair” and threaten the US in high-
tech sectors. While much focus has been on tariffs on steel and other heavy 
industrial goods, the US tariffs also target a range of high-tech industries, 
                                                                        
2 The WTO is the only global impartial organization that regulates trade among the 164 
countries that belong to it. 
particularly where the Chinese are likely to become leaders in the next decade. 
This has further led credence to the argument that, in recent times, the rise of 
China and other vibrant emerging economies have posed huge competitions for 
the US and other developed economies, with uneven patterns of winners and 
losers within them (Rugman and Li, 2007; Hsiang, 2016; Lee and Schwartz, 
2016; Rugman, 2016). 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Deadweight Loss and Harberger's Triangle 
Deadweight loss (also known as excess burden or allocative inefficiency) 
is the loss of economic efficiency that occurs when equilibrium for a 
good/service is not achieved (such that optimal or allocative efficiency is not 
achieved). It is the loss of welfare, social surplus or utility for 
consumers/producers due to reasons like tariffs, subsidies, taxes, price 
ceilings/floors, externalities and monopoly pricing (Coughlin, 2010; Dixon and 
Rimmer, 2010; Irwin, 2010; Porcher, 2014). For tariffs, deadweight loss is the 
excess burden created due to loss of benefit to participants in trade which can 
be consumers, producers or the government. If tariff is imposed on a firm for 
each unit of the good it imports, the new equilibrium price will be higher (Chen 
and Ma, 2012). Therefore, some of the burden is passed on to the consumer and 
this leads to reduced trade from both sides. The loss in welfare is attributable to 
a shift to less efficient market outcomes which lead to wastage or 
underutilization of resources. 
Harberger's triangle, attributed to Arnold Harberger, can be used to study 
the deadweight loss (as measured on a supply and demand graph) created by 
government intervention in a market (Magee, 2011; Perelman, 2011; Sørensen, 
2011; Harberger and Just, 2012; Wang and Chen, 2012). In the case of tariff, 
the amount of tariff drives a wedge between what consumers pay and what 
producers receive, and the size of the wedge is equivalent to the deadweight loss 
from the tariff (Figure 1). The area denoted by the triangle arises from the fact 
that the intersection of the demand and supply curves are cut short so that the 
producer surplus and consumer surplus are also cut short. The loss of such un-
recouped surplus is the deadweight loss. Economists such as James Tobin have 
argued that the triangles do not have significant effects on the economy, but 
others such as Martin Feldstein have argued on the contrary that they can 
significantly affect long-run economic trends by spinning the trend downwards 
and magnifying losses in the long run (Tobin, 1977; Feldstein, 1999; Fletcher, 
2011; Spulber, 2015; Blinder, 2016; Rösl and Tödter, 2017). 
 
2.2 Application to the US-China Trade War 
The Harberger’s triangle or tariff wedge is the deviation from the equilibrium 
price/quantity as a result of tariff imposition. Put differently, the Harberger’s 
triangle or tariff wedge is the difference between what consumers pay and what 
producers receive (net of tariff) from a transaction. The first round of tariffs on 
$34 billion worth of Chinese imports means that the price for the American 
buyers is greater than the price for the Chinese sellers. With such tariffs, 
consumers pay more than they did before, and suppliers receive less for the good 
than they did before. Represented by the shaded Harberger triangle in Figure 1, 
the deadweight loss created by the tariff is equal to 
 
1
2
× (𝑄∗ − 𝑄𝑡)(𝑃𝑐− 𝑃𝑠)       (1) 
 
Figure 1. The Harberger’s Triangle for US-China Trade War 
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For example, when America imposed a new import duty on China, the 
tariff drives a ‘wedge’ between the price American consumers pay and the price 
Chinese sellers receive. The difference between the price that consumers pay 
and the price that sellers receive is equivalent to the size of the per-unit tariff. In 
line with the law of supply and demand, as the price paid by consumers 
increases, and the price received by sellers decreases, the quantity that each 
wishes to trade will decrease.  
After the tariff is imposed, a new equilibrium is reached, where consumers 
pay more, and the quantity traded falls. With such tariffs, the equilibrium price 
is P* where the difference between the buyer's (Pc) and seller's prices (Ps) equals 
the value of the tariff (Figure 1). The total of the shaded triangular region is the 
Harberger’s triangle which represents the magnitude of the welfare loss. While 
the top shaded triangle represents the loss of welfare to consumers (the demand 
side), the lower shaded triangle represents the loss of welfare to sellers (the 
supply side).  
 
3. Implications 
In line with the deadweight loss in Harberger’s triangle, tariffs and counter-
tariffs will have wider effects on consumers, sellers and the global economy. 
 
3.1 Consumers 
Firms are likely to pass on the additional costs of imposed tariffs to 
consumers by raising prices. The prices of items that directly affect consumers’ 
welfare such as food, prescription drugs and foreign holidays will therefore rise. 
Unlike stocks, prices would rise over a period of months rather than 
immediately, demonstrating the time it may take before consumers begin to feel 
the effects of the trade-war. Not as expected, these tariffs may not bring 
manufacturing jobs back. Any jobs created in industries protected by tariffs 
would be offset by those lost in industries that make use of these products 
experiencing rising costs and export sectors hit by retaliatory tariffs.  
 3.2 Businesses 
It should be noted that the longer the trade war continues, the likelier firms 
get hurt. American businesses have reported increased prices as a result of the 
tariffs, impelling them to make hard choices such as laying off workers or 
delaying expansion plans. Many companies will shift production overseas to 
circumnavigate the tariffs because they may not want to absorb extra costs for 
exports (e.g. Harley-Davidson). Cases like Harley-Davidson has shown that 
Trumponomics indeed have weaknesses. It may be difficult for the US to resolve 
trade deficits bilaterally, especially with China. A lot of US companies have 
moved their production to China; they operate within complex international 
networks and protection will not bring them back to the US. The trade war could 
still extend into areas that have not been considered. For example, it could 
extend into bureaucratic hurdles for companies operating abroad, and 
interference with licensing. 
Similarly, a growing number of Chinese companies are adopting crafty 
ways to evade higher tariffs on their exports to the US. They remove the “Made 
in China” label by shifting production to countries such as Mexico, Serbia and 
Vietnam. For example, Hl Corp, a Shenzhen-listed bike parts maker, has moved 
production to Vietnam. 
 
3.3 Stocks and Investors 
Investors generally loath any sign of protectionism in global markets. For 
example, U.S. stocks declined, with the Dow falling more than 200 points 
immediately after the Trump administration imposed duties on Chinese goods. 
Fears of a global trade war dragged equity prices lower, with all of Wall Street’s 
major indexes recording declines. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 
84.83 points to 25,090.48. The broader S&P 500 Index fell by 0.1% to 2,779.42, 
with the bulk of its primary sectors booking losses. Industries tied to primary 
goods led the declines. The VIX fear index went below 12 on a scale of 1-100 
where 20 is the historic average. Within this time, stocks on all the major US 
indexes have been adversely affected. Indeed, the trade war is getting a large 
part of the investor base noticeably more nervous, which may worsen as the 
trade war continues. 
 
3.4 Cryptocurrency  
Recent history has shown that cryptocurrencies blossom when countries 
battle uncertain economic times. For example, Chinese switched to 
cryptocurrencies when their national currency, the yuan, was devalued. 
Similarly, in 2016, Bitcoin experienced a significant increase during Brexit. As 
the US takes on more countries on a trade war, the value of national currencies 
will likely decline, including the US dollars. Investors will look for alternate 
ways to store their wealth. Traditionally, investors have stored their wealth in 
precious metals like gold and silver but their acquisition and storage are hard 
and expensive. Cryptocurrencies offer the best alternative. 
Cryptocurrencies are digital currency in which encryption techniques are 
used to control the units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, functioning 
independently of a central bank. Cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin provide an 
outlet for wealth that is beyond restriction and confiscation.  Though 
cryptocurrencies are volatile, some investors with appetite for risk may diversify 
into Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. As the trade war hits more countries 
with economic instability, cryptocurrencies are set to increase. 
 
3.5 Currency war 
The trade war could turn into a currency war. Theoretically and 
practically, cheaper currency may be a potential way to offset import tariffs 
(Biswas and Sengupta, 2015; Chow, 2017; Vashneya and Gupta, 2017). For 
example, the yuan has weakened lately against the dollar. The devaluation of 
the yuan could be the first sign that the ongoing trade war may descend into a 
currency war. However, it is an open question whether it is a conscious policy 
move (China has a semi-managed currency).  Since devaluation makes exports 
cheaper and more competitive against foreign manufacturers, allowing the 
national currency to weaken will soften the blow of tariffs on the economy, 
ceteris paribus. Conversely, it will make the foreign products more expensive, 
reinforcing the effects of the tariffs. 
 
3.6 Developed countries 
Even the developed economies could be particularly hit by this. For 
example, Britain is a relatively open economy, advocating for an open global 
trade order (Ojo, 2016; Oliver and Williams, 2016). A weakened rules-based 
world trade system would be damaging for Britain. A change to a more 
protectionist world order would be challenging for the UK, independent of the 
EU (Pabst, 2016). Currently Britain is party to preferential trading arrangements 
with the EU and 50 other partners. The UK is more specialized in services, but 
trade negotiations have become increasingly complicated, particularly in 
services, focusing on harmonizing standards and regulations rather than merely 
reducing tariffs. It may be difficult for a medium-sized country like the UK to 
negotiate favourable trade deals in a fragmented world trade order beyond the 
EU and with other countries. 
 
3.7 Developing countries 
According to an old African proverb, “When elephants fight, it is the grass 
that suffers.” The same is true for the US-China trade war: developing countries 
will be among the hardest hit as, on average, tariffs applied on their exports 
would rise steeply. A trade war would be a severe blow to the world’s poorest 
countries, as it would compromise the fragile global economic recovery, thus 
undermining growth and development around the globe. Moreover, developing 
countries are likely to face higher tariff barriers which may be unfavorable to 
export-oriented growth. Some of the growth miracles, including Japan and 
South Korea, were driven by increased exports to developed countries.  
 Conclusions 
Using deadweight loss (also known as excess burden or allocative 
inefficiency) and Harberger's triangle, this study has shown that the US-China 
Trade war could have boomerang effects and various implications. Firms are 
likely to pass on the additional costs of imposed tariffs to consumers by raising 
prices of items that directly affect consumers’ welfare such as food, prescription 
drugs and foreign holidays. Not as expected, the imposed tariffs may not bring 
manufacturing jobs back.  
Many companies will move their production overseas to circumnavigate 
tariffs because they may not want to absorb extra costs for exports. The trade 
war could even extend into bureaucratic hurdles for companies operating 
abroad, and interfere with licensing. The trade war could get investors more 
nervous, which may worsen as the trade war continues. The trade war could turn 
into a currency war, reinforcing the effects of the tariffs. 
The developed economies could be particularly hit by the trade war (e.g., 
the UK). It may be difficult for a country like the UK to negotiate favourable 
trade deals in a fragmented world trade order. Developing countries will also be 
hard hit as tariffs applied on their exports would rise steeply, thus undermining 
growth and development around the globe. Moreover, they are likely to face 
higher tariff barriers which may spell doom for their export-oriented growth.  
However, it must be noted that restrictions on global trade might be opportunity 
for developing countries to fall back on domestic sectors and develop high-tech 
industries. This may provide a protection for domestic entrepreneurs and 
investors to expand production, learning by doing, giving domestic firms the 
chance to grow and become globally competitive. As firms grow, they may 
invest in physical and human capital and develop new capabilities and skills. 
Once these capabilities are developed domestic firms can compete globally. 
The current waves of tariffs and counter-tariffs by US, China and major 
trading countries represent a reversal of efforts (multilateral cooperation, and 
eight rounds of global trade negotiations, first under the GATT and then under 
the World Trade Organization) since the end of World War II to remove trade 
barriers and promote uninterrupted global commerce. In the current trade war, 
everyone is likely to lose. Companies will lose profits; workers will lose jobs. 
Governments will lose revenue; consumers will have fewer products to choose 
from. Households, firms, and governments would incur higher costs. A global 
trade war would threaten the multilateral trading system itself.  
However, the effects of the trade war are likely to hit some industries 
and regions harder than others. It would cause disruption in global supply chains 
which are likely to cause the largest drag on global growth from the strain over 
trade (Hughes, 2005; Korniyenko, Pinat and Dew, 2017; Manners-Bell, 2017). 
Summarily, trade war is debilitating not just for the US and China, but for the 
whole world economy.  
This study has its limitations. A major limitation of this study pertains to 
the lack of empirical evidence; further research could therefore focus on 
empirical veriﬁcation of the effects of the US-China trade war on consumers, 
firms, stocks, cryptocurrency, developed and developing countries, in various 
settings and using different methodologies. Such detailed empirical 
investigation would be very interesting and promising.  
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